Outside income and moral hazard : the elusive quest for good politicians

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dc.contributor.author Gagliarducci, Stefano
dc.contributor.author Nannicini, Tommaso
dc.contributor.author Naticchioni, Paolo
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2008-01-21T11:51:39Z
dc.date.available 2008-01-21T11:51:39Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/711
dc.description.abstract In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. Conversely, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in many respects, like voting attendance and bills sponsorship.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 07-18
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Politicians
dc.subject.other Moral hazard
dc.subject.other Adverse selection
dc.subject.other Absenteeism
dc.subject.other Outside income
dc.title Outside income and moral hazard : the elusive quest for good politicians
dc.type workingPaper
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel J45
dc.subject.jel P16
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we073218
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