Liberal democracy as the result of an "aborted" communist revolution

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Show simple item record Cabrales, Antonio Calvó-Armengol, Antoni Wantchekon, Léonard
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2007-04-02T08:09:56Z 2007-04-02T08:09:56Z 2006-12
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We propose a model of the transition from a ”big man” authoritarian regime to either a liberal democracy or a communist regime. An underground organization votes on whether to summon a mass event. If it is summoned, the organization members decide whether to put effort into the event. Higher effort makes regime change more likely, but it is individually risky. This creates the possibility, in principle, of high and low effort equilibria. But we show, using weak dominance arguments, that only the high effort equilibrium is ”credible.” Thus, internal party democracy is shown to be an efficiency enhancing element for political transitions. We extend the model to show that other internal organization aspects are key for the existence and welfare properties of this equilibrium. Finally we also show when is the process likely to end up in either democracy (and its ”quality”) or a full communist regime.
dc.format.extent 242354 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 07-12
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.title Liberal democracy as the result of an "aborted" communist revolution
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we072212
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