Licensing in the presence of competing technologies

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dc.contributor.author Arora, Ashish
dc.contributor.author Fosfuri, Andrea
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2010-01-20T09:13:01Z
dc.date.available 2010-01-20T09:13:01Z
dc.date.issued 1998-10
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6532
dc.description.abstract In technology-based industries, many incumbent fIrms license their technology to other fIrms that will potentially compete with them. Such a strategy is diffIcult to explain within traditional models of licensing. This paper extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the widespread assumption of a "unique" technology holder. We develop a model with many technological trajectories for the production of a differentiated good. We fmd that competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations, and that the number of licenses can be ineffIciently large. A strong testable implication of our theory is that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Business Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 97-72-14
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Technology licensing
dc.subject.other Market structure
dc.subject.other Market for technology
dc.title Licensing in the presence of competing technologies
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Empresa
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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