Selling information in extensive form games

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Show simple item record Perea, Andrés Swinkels, Jeroen
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2009-12-17T13:48:18Z 2009-12-17T13:48:18Z 1999-06
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We consider a situation in wich decision markets in an extensive form game can by aditional information from an information seller before reaching their decisions. Prices for information are selected by the seller. We analyze a variety of scenarios for the price sitting process by the seller: the case in which prices are chosen before the game stars (ex-ante pricing), the case in which prices are chosen during the game (ex-post pricing) and the situation in which the seller can pit buyers against each other in determining what information is to be sold. Within the context of ex-ante pricin, we also consider the situaction in which the pricise information offered to the decision makers is not exogenously given but is selected by the seller.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 99-44-18
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Extensive form games
dc.subject.other Information
dc.title Selling information in extensive form games
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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