Allocating environmental costs among heterogeneous sources: The linear damage equivalent mechanism

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dc.contributor.author Arguedas, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Kranich, Laurence
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2009-12-14T15:27:22Z
dc.date.available 2009-12-14T15:27:22Z
dc.date.issued 1997-07
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6042
dc.description.abstract A group of firms has to divide the costs associated with environmental damages jointly generated as a by-product of their heterogeneous production activities. We propose a specific procedure to assign costs, the Linear Damage Equivalent Mechanism (LDE), which satisfies several appealing strategic and axiomatic properties. The LDE induces a strategic game that has an unambiguous noncooperative prediction, a unique Nash equilibrium which is also robust to coalitional deviations; moreover, the equilibrium is efficient. Among its other properties, we find that the LDE is immune to arbitrary changes in the units of account of the outputs.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1997-54-25
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Environmental damages
dc.subject.other Cost-sharing
dc.subject.other Heterogeneous sources
dc.title Allocating environmental costs among heterogeneous sources: The linear damage equivalent mechanism
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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