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On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
Autor(es):
Frutos, María Ángeles de; Rosenthal, Robert W.
Editor:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Fecha de edición:
1997-04
ISSN:
2340-5031
Serie/Num.:
UC3M Working papers. Economics
1997-34-12
1997-34-12
Palabras clave:
Auctions
,
Common valued objects
,
Information revelation
Derechos:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Resumen:
Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicl
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On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE [761]
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Economists Online [3212]