On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

Frutos, María Ángeles de; Rosenthal, Robert  W.

On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

Autor(es): Frutos, María Ángeles de; Rosenthal, Robert W.

Editor: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Fecha de edición: 1997-04

ISSN: 2340-5031

Serie/Num.: UC3M Working papers. Economics
1997-34-12

Palabras clave: Auctions , Common valued objects , Information revelation

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6023

Derechos: Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España

Resumen:

Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicl [+]

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