Coalition Formation and Stability

Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Coalition Formation and Stability

Autor(es): Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Editorial: Springer

Fecha de edición: 2006

Cita: Social Choice and Welfare. October 2006, vol. 27, nº 2, p. 365-375

ISSN: 1432-217X

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

Agradecimientos: Romero–Medina acknowledges financial support from MEC SEJ 2005–06167/ECON and Comunidad de Madrid Project 06/HSE/0170/2004. Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, project SEJ 2004–08011/ECON, FEDER, and Institut Valencià d’Investigacions Económiques.

Revisado: PeerReviewed

Versión de: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5640

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

Palabras clave: Coalition Formation , Core , NUT Games , Stability

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5610

Derechos: © Springer

Resumen:

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocati [+]