Citation:
Social Choice and Welfare. October 2006, vol. 27, nº 2, p. 365-375
ISSN:
1432-217X
DOI:
10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1
Sponsor:
Romero–Medina acknowledges financial support from MEC SEJ 2005–06167/ECON and Comunidad
de Madrid Project 06/HSE/0170/2004. Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the
Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, project SEJ 2004–08011/ECON, FEDER, and Institut
Valencià d’Investigacions Económiques.
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which
every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify
four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each
condition, stable (core) allocatiThis paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which
every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify
four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each
condition, stable (core) allocations exists.[+][-]
Description:
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com