Coalition Formation and Stability

Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Coalition Formation and Stability

Author(s): Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Publisher: Springer

Issued date: 2006

Citation: Social Choice and Welfare. October 2006, vol. 27, nº 2, p. 365-375

ISSN: 1432-217X

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

Sponsor: Romero–Medina acknowledges financial support from MEC SEJ 2005–06167/ECON and Comunidad de Madrid Project 06/HSE/0170/2004. Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, project SEJ 2004–08011/ECON, FEDER, and Institut Valencià d’Investigacions Económiques.

Review: PeerReviewed

Version of: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5640

Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

Keywords: Coalition Formation , Core , NUT Games , Stability

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5610

Rights: © Springer

Abstract:

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocati [+]