Citation:
Economics Letters. 2005, vol. 86, nº 2, p. 153-158
ISSN:
0165-1765
DOI:
10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013
Sponsor:
Alcalde’s work is
partially supported by the Institut Valencia` d’Investigacions Econo`miques and the Spanish Ministerio de
Educacio´n y Cultura under project BEC 2001-0535. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support
from the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Cultura under project BCE-2002-02194 and Comunidad de
Madrid under project 02303.
This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect EThis paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).[+][-]