Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

Author(s): Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Publisher: Elsevier

Issued date: 2005

Citation: Economics Letters. 2005, vol. 86, nº 2, p. 153-158

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013

Sponsor: Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valencia` d’Investigacions Econo`miques and the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Cultura under project BEC 2001-0535. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Cultura under project BCE-2002-02194 and Comunidad de Madrid under project 02303.

Review: PeerReviewed

Version of: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6126
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5627

Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013

Keywords: Matching problems , Sequential mechanisms , Stability

JEL Classification: C78 , D78

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5594

Rights: © Elsevier

Abstract:

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect E [+]

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