Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

Autor(es): Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Editorial: Elsevier

Fecha de edición: 2005

Cita: Economics Letters. 2005, vol. 86, nº 2, p. 153-158

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013

Agradecimientos: Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valencia` d’Investigacions Econo`miques and the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Cultura under project BEC 2001-0535. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Cultura under project BCE-2002-02194 and Comunidad de Madrid under project 02303.

Revisado: PeerReviewed

Versión de: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6126
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5627

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013

Palabras clave: Matching problems , Sequential mechanisms , Stability

Clasificación JEL: C78 , D78

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5594

Derechos: © Elsevier

Resumen:

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect E [+]

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