Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems

Alcalde, J.; Romero-Medina, Antonio

dc.contributor.author	Alcalde, J.
dc.contributor.author	Romero-Medina, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned	2012-10-19T11:48:31Z
dc.date.available	2012-10-19T11:48:31Z
dc.date.issued	2000
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 31, nº 2, p. 294-302
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588
dc.description.abstract	This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
dc.description.sponsorship	Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valencia d’Investigacions Econòmiques and DGICYT under project PB 97–0131. Romero–Medina acknowledges financial support from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGICYT under project PB 92–0590.
dc.format.mimetype	text/plain
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.rights	© Academic Press
dc.subject.other	Matching problems
dc.title	Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems
dc.type	article
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0743
dc.subject.jel	C78
dc.subject.jel	D78
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.identifier.doi	10.1006/game.1999.0743
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.type.version	acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage	294
dc.identifier.publicationissue	2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage	302
dc.identifier.publicationtitle	Games and Economic Behavior
dc.identifier.publicationvolume	31