Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems

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Show simple item record Alcalde, J. Romero-Medina, Antonio 2012-10-19T11:48:31Z 2012-10-19T11:48:31Z 2000
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 31, nº 2, p. 294-302
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
dc.description.sponsorship Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valencia d’Investigacions Econòmiques and DGICYT under project PB 97–0131. Romero–Medina acknowledges financial support from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGICYT under project PB 92–0590.
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Academic Press
dc.subject.other Matching problems
dc.title Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D78
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/game.1999.0743
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 294
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 302
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Games and Economic Behavior
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 31
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