Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market

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Show simple item record Romero-Medina, Antonio 2012-10-19T09:07:49Z 2012-10-19T09:07:49Z 1998
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Review of Economic Design. July 1998, vol. 3, nº 2, p. 137-147
dc.identifier.issn 1434-4750
dc.description The original publication is available at
dc.description.abstract I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student’s optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students’ optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.
dc.description.sponsorship Financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGCYT under project PB 92–0590, is gratefully acknowleged.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Matching markets
dc.subject.other Implementation
dc.title Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel C71
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D78
dc.subject.jel J24
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s100580050009
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 137
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 147
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Review of Economic Design
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 3
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