Citation:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2003, vol. 119, nº 2, p. 395-405
ISSN:
0022-3239
DOI:
10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005453.96575.2a
Sponsor:
The first author acknowledges financial support from Junta de Castilla y León Project VA
108 01 and Dirección General de Investigación Project BFM2002–00425.
The second author acknowledges financial support from JCYL Project VA051 03 and MCYT
Project BEC2002-0236, cofinanced by FEDER funds.
In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.[+][-]
Description:
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com