Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

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dc.contributor.author Ok, Efe A.
dc.contributor.author Ortuño, Ignacio
dc.contributor.author Faulí-Oller, Ramón
dc.contributor.other CEPR
dc.date.accessioned 2009-10-22T12:02:55Z
dc.date.available 2009-10-22T12:02:55Z
dc.date.issued 2001
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5529
dc.description.abstract We consider a model of political competition between two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates are feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party’s ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries nº 2799
dc.relation.hasversion http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5526
dc.relation.hasversion http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5501
dc.rights © CEPR
dc.subject.other Polarization
dc.subject.other Political competition
dc.title Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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