Divide the dollar, a model of interregional redistributive politics

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dc.contributor.author Schultz, C.
dc.contributor.author Ortuño, Ignacio
dc.contributor.other IVIE
dc.date.accessioned 2009-10-22T11:11:10Z
dc.date.available 2009-10-22T11:11:10Z
dc.date.issued 2000
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5523
dc.description.abstract We develop a dynamic political model of dividing a fixed amount of money among n districts. There are two political parties that make proposal on such divisions and compete in each district. Each district elects a representative to a legislature. Each party is governed by its representatives who are elected to the legislature. Voters are myopic and there is a slight incumbency advantage. We show that if all districts are of the same size then they all get the same share in the long run.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries AD 2000-28
dc.rights © IVIE
dc.subject.other Interregional distribution
dc.subject.other Political competition
dc.subject.other Dynamic competition
dc.title Divide the dollar, a model of interregional redistributive politics
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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