Public funding of political parties

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dc.contributor.author Ortuño, Ignacio
dc.contributor.author Schultz, C.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-02T11:04:14Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-02T11:04:14Z
dc.date.issued 2005
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, v. 7, n. 5, pp. 781-791
dc.identifier.issn 1467-9779
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5504
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. These funds finance electoral campaigns. It is shown that such a funding system increases policy convergence. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. If the parties have access to other means of campaign finance given in a lump-sum way, the effect is moderated.
dc.description.sponsorship Ortuno-Ortin gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT PB-970131
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Blackwell
dc.relation.isversionof http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5522
dc.rights © Blackwell
dc.subject.other Public funding
dc.subject.other Political competition
dc.subject.other Information
dc.title Public funding of political parties
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00244.x
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00244.x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 781
dc.identifier.publicationissue 5
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 791
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of Public Economic Theory
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 7
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