Citation:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, v. 19, n. 3, pp. 551-567
ISSN:
1432-217X
DOI:
10.1007/s003550100132
Sponsor:
I wish to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish
Ministry of Educacion, projects no. PB94 1504, PB93 0342, PB97 0131 and D.G.I.C.T.
mobility grant
We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition
with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We assume
that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians;
members care about the policy enacted,We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition
with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We assume
that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians;
members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the
contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities:
that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians
are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members
is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians
have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties
to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which
professional politicians have much better information than the members of the
party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected
utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional
politicians choose.[+][-]
Description:
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com