Citation:
Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, v. 15, n. 3, pp. 445-454
ISSN:
1432-217X
DOI:
10.1007/s003550050116
Sponsor:
The second author
wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education,
projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grant The first author is
supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The second author
wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education,
projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grant
A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with
endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium
there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme
positions of the policy space. The adopted polA one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with
endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium
there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme
positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise
between these two extremes[+][-]