Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

Ortuño, Ignacio; Gerber, A.

Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

Autor(es): Ortuño, Ignacio; Gerber, A.

Editorial: Springer

Fecha de edición: 1998

Cita: Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, v. 15, n. 3, pp. 445-454

ISSN: 1432-217X

DOI: 10.1007/s003550050116

Agradecimientos: The second author wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education, projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grant
The first author is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The second author wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education, projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grant

Revisado: PeerReviewed

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050116

Palabras clave: Coalitions , Political parties , Endogenous party formation

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5499

Derechos: © Springer

Resumen:

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted pol [+]

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