Politically realistic implementation with inspection : the honesty equity tradeoff

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dc.contributor.author Ortuño, Ignacio
dc.contributor.author Roemer, J.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-04T08:30:36Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-04T08:30:36Z
dc.date.issued 1993
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics and Politics, 1993, v. 5, n. 3, pp. 255-270
dc.identifier.issn 1468-0343
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5492
dc.description The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com
dc.description.abstract We study dominant strategy mechanisms where the planner knows the distribution of types and the agents are instructed to announce their types to the planner. It is assumed that the planner has access to a technology of inspection which is costly but perfect, and that he can penalize an agent who is inspected after announcements have been made if he is found to have lied about his type. It shall be shown that, in general, the welfare-maximizing mechanism that respects minimal equity will induce some agents to lie about their types
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Blackwell
dc.rights © Blackwell
dc.title Politically realistic implementation with inspection : the honesty equity tradeoff
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00078.x
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00078.x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 255
dc.identifier.publicationissue 3
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 270
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economics and Politics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 5
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