A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Jerez, Belén
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-17T11:21:56Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-17T11:21:56Z
dc.date.issued 2003
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 112, nº 1, p. 1-34
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5314
dc.description.abstract We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.relation.isversionof http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5324
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.subject.other Asymmetric information
dc.subject.other Incentive efficiency
dc.subject.other Linear programming
dc.subject.other Duality
dc.title A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4
dc.subject.jel D50
dc.subject.jel C61
dc.subject.jel D82
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1
dc.identifier.publicationissue 1
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of Economic Theory
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 112
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record