Competition among auctioneers

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
dc.contributor.other IVIE
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-15T08:15:12Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-15T08:15:12Z
dc.date.issued 2001
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5180
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. In a first stage, auctioneers commit to some publicly announced reserve prices, and in a second stage, bidders choose to participate in one of the auctions. We prove existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for the whole game. We also show that one property of the equilibrium set is that when the numbers of auctioneers and bidders tend to infinity, almost all auctioneers with production cost low enough to trade announce a reserve price equal to their production costs. Our paper confirms previous results for some "limit" versions of the model by McAfee [9], Peters [13], and Peters and Severinov [18].
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP-AD 2001-18
dc.relation.hasversion http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5171
dc.subject.other Auctions
dc.subject.other Perfect Competition
dc.subject.other Large Markets
dc.title Competition among auctioneers
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record