Successful uninformed bidding

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dc.contributor.author Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
dc.contributor.other IVIE
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-15T08:07:58Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-15T08:07:58Z
dc.date.issued 2001
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5179
dc.description.abstract This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better informed bidders, and sometimes, even with higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of worse informed bidders and the number of units for sale. Finally we argue that the correct intuitive explanation of these results relies on the balance of the winner’s curse and the loser’s curse effects.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP-AD 2001-06
dc.subject.other asymmetric bidders
dc.subject.other common value
dc.subject.other winner`s curse
dc.subject.other loser`s curse
dc.title Successful uninformed bidding
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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