Successful uninformed bidding

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Show simple item record Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
dc.contributor.other Sociedad Econométrica 2009-09-14T15:42:36Z 2009-09-14T15:42:36Z 2000
dc.description.abstract This paper studies multiunit common value auctions with informed and less informed bidders. In these auctions, we show that bidders with less information can bid very aggressively and do surprisingly well. We also show that the degree of aggressiveness and success of bidders with less information is positively related to the number of units for sale. We explain these phenomena in terms of the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse and their di erential e ect on bidders with di erent quality of information.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries 791
dc.subject.other common value
dc.subject.other uninformed bidders
dc.subject.other multi-unit auctions
dc.subject.other loser`s curse
dc.title Successful uninformed bidding
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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