Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play

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Show simple item record Ferreira, José Luis Gilboa, I. Maschler, M.
dc.contributor.other Universidad Northwestem. Centro de estuidos matématicos en economía y dirección de ciencia 2009-09-14T08:57:35Z 2009-09-14T08:57:35Z 1992
dc.description Publicado por Tilburg Center Economic Research 1992
dc.description.abstract Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflicto In this paper we propose an extensiveform game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries 988
dc.title Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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