Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play

Ferreira, José Luis; Gilboa, I.; Maschler, M.

dc.contributor.author	Ferreira, José Luis
dc.contributor.author	Gilboa, I.
dc.contributor.author	Maschler, M.
dc.contributor.other	Universidad Northwestem. Centro de estuidos matématicos en economía y dirección de ciencia
dc.date.accessioned	2009-09-14T08:57:35Z
dc.date.available	2009-09-14T08:57:35Z
dc.date.issued	1992
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5158
dc.description	Publicado por Tilburg Center Economic Research 1992
dc.description.abstract	Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflicto In this paper we propose an extensiveform game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries	988
dc.relation.hasversion	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5130
dc.title	Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play
dc.type	workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess