The role of observability in futures markets

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dc.contributor.author Ferreira, José Luis
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-11T13:40:33Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-11T13:40:33Z
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics Topics. 2006, vol. 6, nº 1, art. 7, p. 1-22
dc.identifier.issn 1935-1704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5154
dc.description.abstract Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that in an oligopolistic industry the introduction of a futures market that operates prior to the spot market induces more competitive outcomes. Hughes and Kao (1997) show that this result presumes that firms’ future positions are perfectly observed, and that when firms’ positions are not observed the Cournot outcome arises. We study an alternative formulation of observability, where the behavior of participants in the futures market is explicitly analyzed, and show that this approach leads to different results. Imperfect observability induces more competitive outcomes than Allaz and Vila’s model.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Berkeley Electronic Press
dc.rights ©Berkeley Electronic Press
dc.subject.other Futures markets
dc.subject.other Observability
dc.subject.other arbitrage
dc.subject.other cournot competitions
dc.title The role of observability in futures markets
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1266&context=bejte
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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