Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Games

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dc.contributor.author Ferreira, José Luis
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-27T15:08:20Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-27T15:08:20Z
dc.date.issued 1999-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior (1999), 26(1), 40-58
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5139
dc.description.abstract In this paper we extend the definitions of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and communication-proof equilibrium to situations of partial communication. Then we use the model of endogenous formation of coalitions of Aumann and Myerson to find that one of these situations in which the corresponding equilibrium exists will be endogenously determined by the players in the game
dc.description.sponsorship Financial support by DGES (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Spain), through projects PB95-0287 and UE95-0042 is gratefully acknowledged.
dc.format.extent 19
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 1999 Academic Press
dc.subject.other Formation of coalitions
dc.subject.other Coalition-proof
dc.subject.other Communication-proof
dc.title Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Games
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0631
dc.subject.jel C70
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/game.1998.0631
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 40
dc.identifier.publicationissue 1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 58
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Games and Economic Behavior
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 26
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