Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France

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dc.contributor.author Gagnepain, Philippe
dc.contributor.author Ivaldi, Marc
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-04T11:35:20Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-04T11:35:20Z
dc.date.issued 2002
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Rand Journal of Economics. 2002, vol. 33, nº. 4, p. 605–629
dc.identifier.issn 1756-2171
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5031
dc.description.abstract We assess the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation, using a principal-agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transport industry. Taking the current regulatory schemes as given, the model of supply and demand provides estimates for the firms’ inefficiency, the effort of managers, and the cost of public funds. It allows us to derive the first-best and second-best regulatory policies for each network and compare them with the actual situation in terms of welfare loss or gain. Fixed-price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second-best schemes. Cost-plus contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contract. From these results, we may conjecture that fixed-price contracts call for better-informed regulators.
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher RAND Corporation
dc.relation.isversionof http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5040
dc.rights © RAND
dc.title Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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