Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory

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dc.contributor.author Fabra, Natalia
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-30T11:04:55Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-30T11:04:55Z
dc.date.issued 2003-09
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Industrial Economics (2003), 51(3), 271-293
dc.identifier.issn 1467-6451
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5000
dc.description This is the accepted version of the following article: Fabra, N. (2003), Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(3), 271–293, which has been published in final form at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00201
dc.description.abstract Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders’ deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the payoff irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.
dc.format.extent 23
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Blackwell
dc.rights © 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
dc.title Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00201
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/1467-6451.00201
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 271
dc.identifier.publicationissue 3
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 293
dc.identifier.publicationtitle The Journal of Industrial Economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 51
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