Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard

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dc.contributor.author Esteban, Susanna
dc.contributor.author Llobet, Gerard
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-23T11:55:31Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-23T11:55:31Z
dc.date.issued 2005
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters, (2005), 88 (2), p. 203-208
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4985
dc.description.abstract In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist's ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2005 Elsevier B.V.
dc.subject.other Monopoly
dc.subject.other Moral hazard
dc.subject.other Scrappage
dc.subject.other Maintenance
dc.subject.other Durability
dc.title Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019
dc.subject.jel L11
dc.subject.jel L12
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 203
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 208
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economics Letters
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 88
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