Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard

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Show simple item record Esteban, Susanna Llobet, Gerard 2014-05-23T11:55:31Z 2014-05-23T11:55:31Z 2005
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters, (2005), 88 (2), p. 203-208
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765
dc.description.abstract In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist's ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2005 Elsevier B.V.
dc.subject.other Monopoly
dc.subject.other Moral hazard
dc.subject.other Scrappage
dc.subject.other Maintenance
dc.subject.other Durability
dc.title Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel L11
dc.subject.jel L12
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 203
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 208
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economics Letters
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 88
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