Endogenous protection of R and D investments

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dc.contributor.author Milliou, Chrysovalantou
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-28T16:07:56Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-28T16:07:56Z
dc.date.issued 2006-11
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/482
dc.description.abstract We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R and D investments from spilling over to competitors. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R and D investments. We also show that even if protection is costless, firms sometimes choose to let their R and D investments unprotected. Our welfare analysis indicates that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge should be adopted.
dc.format.extent 287158 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006-25
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Endogenous protection of R and D investments
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we066325
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