Organized vs. competitive corruption

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dc.contributor.author Celentani, Marco
dc.contributor.author Ganuza, Juan-José
dc.date.accessioned 2012-09-17T12:50:15Z
dc.date.available 2012-09-17T12:50:15Z
dc.date.issued 2002-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Annals of Operations Research, 2002, v. 109, p. 293-315
dc.identifier.issn 1572-9338
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4822
dc.description.abstract We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings: (1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption); (2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is competitive.
dc.description.sponsorship Marco Celentani acknowledges the financial support of DGES of MEC (Spain) under project PB98-00024 and of MURST (Italy) under project 9813282901_004. Juan-José Ganuza acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under project BEC2000-1026
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Competitive and organized corruption
dc.subject.other Institutional response
dc.title Organized vs. competitive corruption
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1023/A:1016364505439
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 293
dc.identifier.publicationissue 109
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 315
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Annals of Operations Research
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