On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions

Frutos, María Ángeles de; Rosenthal, R.

On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions

Autor(es): Frutos, María Ángeles de; Rosenthal, R.

Editorial: Elsevier

Fecha de edición: 1998

Cita: Games and Economic Behavior. 1998, vol. 23, p. 201-221

ISSN: 0899-8256

DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0628

Revisado: PeerReviewed

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0628

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4418

Derechos: ©Elsevier

Resumen:

Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects. In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce public [+]

Mostrar el registro completo del ítem