Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies to Scale

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Frutos, María Ángeles de
dc.date.accessioned 2009-06-15T12:22:28Z
dc.date.available 2009-06-15T12:22:28Z
dc.date.issued 1998
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 79, nº 2, p. 245-275
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4414
dc.description.abstract We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost sharing game. A characterization theorem of the mechanism based on the strategic properties of existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of its noncooperative equilibrium is provided.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights ©Elsevier
dc.title Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies to Scale
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2393
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/jeth.1998.2393
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record