Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

Frutos, María Ángeles de

Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

Autor(es): Frutos, María Ángeles de

Editorial: Elsevier

Fecha de edición: 2000

Cita: Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 33, nº 1, p. 48-71

ISSN: 0899-8256

DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0772

Revisado: PeerReviewed

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0772

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4413

Derechos: © Elsevier

Resumen:

This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the as [+]

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