Contract enforcement and Argentina's long-run decline

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dc.contributor.author Prados de la Escosura, Leandro
dc.contributor.author Sanz Villarroya, Isabel
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-15T15:59:00Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-15T15:59:00Z
dc.date.issued 2006-09
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/439
dc.description.abstract Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson's "Contract Intensive Money", conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country's relative international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina's unique experience of long-run economic decline.
dc.format.extent 404027 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers in Economic History
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006-06
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Contract enforcement and Argentina's long-run decline
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Historia
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec wp06-06
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