An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

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Show simple item record Moreno, Diego Wooders, John 2009-06-12T08:43:19Z 2009-06-12T08:43:19Z 1998
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior. 1998, vol. 24, nº 1-2, p. 47-76
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.description.abstract This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate byplain conversationprior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption ofindividualisticandindependentbehavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to becoordinatedandcorrelated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights ©Elsevier
dc.title An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/game.1997.0624
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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