Welfarism in economic domains

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dc.contributor.author Marhuenda, Francisco
dc.contributor.author Ginés, Miguel
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-28T15:35:38Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-28T15:35:38Z
dc.date.issued 2000
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Theory. 2000, vol. 93, nº 2, p. 191-204
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4316
dc.description.abstract In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights ©Elsevier
dc.title Welfarism in economic domains
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2653
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/jeth.2000.2653
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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