Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty

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Show simple item record Frutos, María Ángeles de Pechlivanos, Lambros 2009-05-27T13:03:50Z 2009-05-27T13:03:50Z 2006-04
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior. 2006, vol. 55, nº 1, p. 43–71
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.description.abstract The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In a two-bidder model, Bikhchandani [1988. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97–119] has shown that if it is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. Employing a similar two-bidder model, this paper shows that this result does not carry over when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. In such case, in every equilibrium, the disadvantaged type bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for the equilibria in two cases, one with two types and another with a continuum of types, and we show that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of the corresponding symmetric auctions. We thus reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of common-value and almost-common-value auctions.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.subject.other Common-value auctions
dc.subject.other Asymmetric bidders
dc.subject.other Spectrum auctions
dc.subject.other Liquidity constraints
dc.title Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.008
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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