Global Budgets and Excess Demand for Hospital Care

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dc.contributor.author Feldman, Roger
dc.contributor.author Lobo, Félix
dc.date.accessioned 2009-12-01T11:39:51Z
dc.date.available 2009-12-01T11:39:51Z
dc.date.issued 1997
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Health Economic. 1997, vol. 6, nº 2, p.187-196
dc.identifier.issn 1099-1050
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4290
dc.description.abstract Excess demand is a pervasive feature of health care systems that use global budgets to pay for hospital care, regardless of the amount of money spent by those systems. This paper presents a theory that explains this feature of global budgets. The theory emphasizes that hospital administrators control the allocation of their budget, and that they choose quantity and resource intensity to maximize their own utility. The equilibrium quantity of care provided may be less than quantity demanded by consumers, leading to excess demand for admissions. An increase in the hospital’s budget may even be associated with an increase in excess demand.
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher John Wiley & Sons
dc.rights ©1997 by John Wiley & Sons
dc.subject.other global budgets
dc.subject.other hospital care
dc.title Global Budgets and Excess Demand for Hospital Care
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/14641/PDFSTART
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199703)6:2<187
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199703)6:2<187
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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