Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

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dc.contributor.author Frutos, María Ángeles de
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-25T15:38:06Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-25T15:38:06Z
dc.date.issued 1999-09
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Review of Economic Design. 1999, vol. 4, nº 3, p. 255–272
dc.identifier.issn 1434-4750 (Online)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4282
dc.description.abstract In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Axiomatic analysis
dc.subject.other merging
dc.subject.other splitting
dc.title Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050037
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s100580050037
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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