Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information

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dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-20T09:54:08Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-20T09:54:08Z
dc.date.issued 1999
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Theory. 1999, vol. 86, nº 2, p. 159-184
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4246
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of “complexity” commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights ©Elsevier
dc.subject.other implementation
dc.subject.other bounded rationality
dc.subject.other evolutionary dynamics
dc.subject.other mechanisms
dc.title Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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