The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

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Show simple item record Einy, Ezra Moreno, Diego Shitovitz, Benyamin 2009-05-14T14:55:05Z 2009-05-14T14:55:05Z 2001-09
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economic Theory. 2001, vol. 18, nº 2, p. 473-484
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479 (Online)
dc.description.abstract We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other General equilibrium in large exchange economies with differential information
dc.subject.other Weak fine bargaining set
dc.subject.other Core
dc.subject.other Value
dc.title The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/PL00004195
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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