The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

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dc.contributor.author Einy, Ezra
dc.contributor.author Moreno, Diego
dc.contributor.author Shitovitz, Benyamin
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-14T13:48:23Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-14T13:48:23Z
dc.date.issued 1999-02
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation International Journal of Game Theory. 1999, vol. 28, nº 1, p. 1-14
dc.identifier.issn 1432-1270 (Online)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4221
dc.description.abstract We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension on the space B 1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension is concave then the core of the game v is non-empty iff is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B 1. We use this result to obtain representation theorems for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v=f where μ is a finite dimensional vector of measures and f is a concave function. We also apply our results to some non-atomic games which occur in economic applications.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Coalitional game
dc.subject.other Core
dc.subject.other Non-atomic games
dc.title The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050094
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s001820050094
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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