Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic

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dc.contributor.author Moreno, Diego
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-14T13:36:59Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-14T13:36:59Z
dc.date.issued 1999-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economic Theory. 1999, vol. 13, nº 1, p. 183-197
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479 (Online)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4220
dc.description.abstract A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness leads to (full) dictatorship.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.title Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050247
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s001990050247
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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