The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

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Show simple item record Einy, Ezra Monderer, Dov Moreno, Diego 2009-05-14T13:26:04Z 2009-05-14T13:26:04Z 1998-04
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 11, nº 3, p. 585-601
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479 (Online)
dc.description.abstract We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.title The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s001990050203
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Economía
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