Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable

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Show simple item record Moreno, Diego Walker, Mark 2009-05-14T12:56:48Z 2009-05-14T12:56:48Z 1991-07
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Social Choice Welfare. 1991, vol. 8, nº 3, p. 221-233
dc.identifier.issn 1432-217X (Online)
dc.description.abstract Recent papers by Barberá and Peleg and by Zhou have established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem remains valid when individuals are restricted to reporting only reasonable preferences. We present a theorem that covers situations in which, as in Barberá-and-Peleg and Zhou, preferences may be restricted to reasonable ones, but in which, additionally, it may be known in advance that some dimensions of the social decision do not affect all the participants — i.e., in which the social decisions are partially decomposable into decisions that affect only subsets of the participants. As in the previous theorems, the conclusion of this new theorem is that nonmanipulable voting schemes must be dictatorial.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.title Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/BF00177660
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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