Robust implementation under alternative information structures

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Show simple item record Corchón, Luis C. Ortuño, Ignacio 2009-05-12T15:27:42Z 2009-05-12T15:27:42Z 1995
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Review Economic Design, 1995, v. 1, n. 1, pp. 159-171
dc.identifier.issn 1434-4750
dc.description The original publication is available at
dc.description.abstract In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the firts, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechinism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto powe in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view ofthe desinner of the information possessed by agents about the environment.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Nash implementation
dc.subject.other Incomplete information
dc.subject.other Local information
dc.title Robust implementation under alternative information structures
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/BF02716619
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.publicationissue 1
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Review Economic Design
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 1
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