Comparative Statics for Aggregative Games: The Strong Concavity Case

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Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem Corchón, Luis C. 2009-05-12T08:19:39Z 2009-05-12T08:19:39Z 1994
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Mathematical Social Sciences. 1994, vol. 28, p. 151-165
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896
dc.description.abstract In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or a parameter in the payoff funtions) on the strategies played an payoffs obtained in a Nash equilibrium in the framework of an Aggregative Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a strong concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player is decreasing in the sum of the strategies of the remaining players(i.e. strategic subtitutin). Our results generalize and unify those known in the Cournot model.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights ©Elsevier
dc.subject.other Comparative statics
dc.subject.other games
dc.title Comparative Statics for Aggregative Games: The Strong Concavity Case
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/0165-4896(94)90001-9
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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