Endogenous platforms : the case of many parties

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dc.contributor.author Gomberg, Andrei
dc.contributor.author Marhuenda, Francisco
dc.contributor.author Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-08T13:53:55Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-08T13:53:55Z
dc.date.issued 2007-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation International Journal of Game Theory, 2007, v. 35, n. 2, pp. 223-249
dc.identifier.issn 1432-1270 (Online)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4175
dc.description.abstract We analyze existence of equilibrium in a one-dimensional model of endogenous party platforms and more than two parties. The platforms proposed by parties depend on their membership composition. The policy implemented is a function of the different proposals and the vote distribution among such proposals. It is shown that if voters are sincere there is always an equilibrium regardless of the number of parties. In the case of strategic voting behavior, existence of equilibrium can be shown provided a subadditivity condition on the outcome function holds.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.title Endogenous platforms : the case of many parties
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0041-6
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00182-006-0041-6
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 223
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 249
dc.identifier.publicationtitle International Journal of Game Theory
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 35
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