Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record Einy, Ezra Holzman, Ron Monderer, Dov Shitovitz, Benyamin
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2009-04-15T09:38:11Z 2009-04-15T09:38:11Z 1996-02
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players, and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential to our results.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1996-12-07
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.title Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)

The following license files are associated with this item:

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record