Optimal procurement mechanism with observable quality

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dc.contributor.author Ganuza, Juan-José
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2009-04-15T09:05:38Z
dc.date.available 2009-04-15T09:05:38Z
dc.date.issued 1995-01
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3963
dc.description.abstract In a procurement contract the Administration usually has some prior information about the quality of the bidding firms. The goal of this article is to characterize the optimal mechanism in such a situation, when firms have private information about their costs. The optimal mechanism selects low-quality firms more often than it would be efficient with perfect information. We also compare this mechanism with others frequently used by the Spanish Administration such as the first price sealed bid auction and the previous admission auction.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1995-08-05
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Procurement
dc.subject.other Quality
dc.subject.other Auctions
dc.subject.other Optimal Mechanism
dc.title Optimal procurement mechanism with observable quality
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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