An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games

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dc.contributor.author Moreno, Diego
dc.contributor.author Wooders, John
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2009-04-08T10:21:31Z
dc.date.available 2009-04-08T10:21:31Z
dc.date.issued 1995-07
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3914
dc.description.abstract This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be cooperative and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1995-30-18
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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